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ABSTRACT 
A simple growth  accounting  framework  is  used  to try and  identify 
the  contribution of  total  factor  inputs  and  total  factor  productivity as 
components  of  the evolution of  real  output  in  the  four  largest  Community 
countries.  In  addition,  some  attention is paid to  the growth  of factor 
substitution  and  capital productivity  in  explaining  observed  changes  in 
the growth  of output  per  head.  The  general  impression given  by  the 
analysis  is that  for  some  time,  the efficiency of  investment  in all  four 
countries  has  been declining. I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
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I.  Introduction and  Overview 
A good  deal  of  interest  has  centred on  the observed  deceleration 
in  the annual  average  rate of growth  of both  real output  and  real  output 
per  head  in  OECD  countries during  the  1970's.  Recent  examples  of detailed 
analysis  and  alternative explanations  in this area  include those by 
Baily  (1981/1982)  and  Dennison  (1983)  for  the United  States.  For  other 
countries and  OECD  countries  in general  we  have  Kendrick  (1981),  the 
volume  of  contributions edited by  Matthews  (1982)  and  the  Economic  Journal 
Symposium  (1982),  together  with  a  considerable number  of other exercises. 
As  to the occurence  of  a  deceleration in the evolution of general 
economic  activity there ;s no  reasonable doubt.  Real  GDP  for  OECD  countries 
as a  whole  grew  at  an  annual  compound  rate of  4.0 per  cent  between  1960 
and  1981.  From  1973  to 1979  this  rate of evolution fell  to 2.7  per  cent. 
For  EEC  countries  taken  together  the figures  are 3.6 and  2.5  per  cent 
respectively. 
Table  1  below  shows  for  some  selected sub-periods  between  1960  and 
1981  how  the  slowdown  has  evolved. 
Table  1 
Growth  of  Real  GOP  % 
Growth  of  real  GOP*  1960-81  1960-68  1968-73  1973-79 
OECD  countries  4.0  5.1  4.7  2.7 
EEC  countries  3.6  4.5  4.9  2.5 
Growth  of  real  employee *  GOP  per 
OECD  countries  3.0  4.1  3.6  1.6 
EEC  countries  3.4  4.4  4.4  2.3 
* Source  OECD 
11Historical  Statistics 1960-1981
11
,  Paris 1983. 
Thus  looking  at  the picture overall  in  terms  of national output, 
the  OECD  statistical series  suggests  a  more  or  less  continuous  tendency 
for  the  rate of  increase  in activity in  OECD  countries to decline through 
the  last  two  decades.  Within  the  EEC  bloc  however  the  rate of  expansion -8-
increased  up  to 1973.  From  that  year  onwards,  the  pace  appears  to  have 
decelerated  sharply  for  both  groups  of  countries. 
Of  at  least  equal  interest over  this same  period  is the behaviour 
of  productivity,  that  is of output  in  relation to  the  more  important 
of  those  inputs  which  generate it.  By  far  the  most  popular  indicator 
used  is  real  output  per  head.  The  measure  is widely  available,  often 
on  alternative bases  and  there  are  good  and  obvious  reasons  as  to  why 
labour  productivity is of  interest  in its own  right.  Initially, 
therefore,  it is useful  to  see  how  this  has  evolved  over  the more  recent 
past. 
Again,  we  find  that  for  the  OECD  and  European  Community  countries 
considered  as  broad  groups,  the  growth  of total output  per  head 
decelerated  sharply  in the past  1973  period.  As  Table 1  shows,  between 
1973  and  1979,  labour  productivity growth  was  around  one  half of the 
rate  experienced  through  the  nineteen sixties and  early seventies. 
We  turn  next  in  similar  fashion  to  a  summary  appraisal  of  economic 
performance  in the  four  largest  Community  countries,  namely  France, 
Germany,  Italy and  the  United  Kingdom. 
Looking at the  two  decades  1960-81  together,  Table  2  shows  that  the 
average  growth  of  real  GDP  in  both  France  and  Italy exceeded  both  the 
EEC  and  OECD  average.  The  same  is  true of  the  growth  of  real  output 
in  the  Industrial  and  Manufacturing  sectors.  Whilst  the  United  Kingdom 
has  lagged  behin~ through  the  post-war  period,  it is  interesting to  note 
the  weakening  performance  of  the  German  economy.  Once  a  prominent  leader 
through  the  fifties  and  sixties, economic  performance  in these  terms 
began  to  weaken. 
Table  2  shows  also  that  following  the first oil  price  shock  in  1973, 
essentially a  similar  story  holds  in  aggregate.  Again,  France  and  Italy 
have  an  above  average  growth  record  in  the  three  sectors,  whereas  the 
German  and  UK  economies  are at, or  below,  the group  averages. -9-
Turning  next  to  the  evolutio~ of  real  output  for  persons  employed, 
Table  3  summarises  the  comparisons  in  the  same  way.  Over  the  complete 
sample  period,  a  similar  story emerges  which  serves  to underline  the 
relative strength  of  France  and  Italy.  Indeed,  the  labour  productivity 
performance  of  Germany  was  well  above  the  European  Community  and  OECD 
country  averages.  In  the  UK,  the growth  of  labour  productivity through 
the  sub-period  was  relatively weak,  particularly in  the  manufacturing 
sector. 
The  reason  why  labour productivity growth  was  maintained  in  the 
German  economy  is to be  found  initially in the fact  that  employment  growth 
virtually stagnated  as  compared  with  France  and  Italy.  Indeed,  over  the 
1973-79  period,  in  Germany  only  did  total  employment  decline at  a  rate 
of  0.6  per  cent  per  annum.  France  and  the  UK  experienced  modest  increases 
of  around  0.2  per  cent  per  annum  and  in  Italy the  annual  average  increase 
was  around  1.0 per  cent. T
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Although  there is much to be said for looking at the growth of both 
real  output  and  output  per  head  as  global  and  national  performance  indi-
cators,  some  studies  have  preferred to  include  estimates of output  per 
unit  of  capital  also.  Thus  estimates of total  factor  productivity attempt 
to  account  for  differences  in  performance  in  a  more  comprehensive  way  (1). 
Whilst  there  are  numerous  and  now  well-rehearsed  arguments  concerned  with 
the  notion of total  factor  productivity,  what  it might  mean  in practice, 
how  it can  be  approximated  and  so  on,  there are  undoubtedly  ~ery good 
grounds  for  trying  to  account  for  output  variations  in  terms  of  more  than 
just one  major  factor  input. 
This  exercise  looks  at  a  few  aspects  of the qrowth  of productivity 
and  factor  inputs  in the  four  largest  EEC  countries,  France,  Germany,  Italy 
and  the  United  Kingdom.  There  is  no  attempt  at  repeating  a  Dennison-style 
detailed assessment  of the  multitude of factors  which  might  have  been 
responsible for  observed growth  performance.  Instead,  more  attention is 
paid to  sectoral differences  in  the  four  countries  and  of the relative 
contribution which  changes  in  the  growth  of total  factor  productivity and 
factor  substitution might  have  made  to  changes  in  the growth  of output  per 
employee. 
The  Level  of  disaggregation  here  prevents  one  from  making  many 
of  the  more  populat statistical adjustments  or  refinements.  Inter-
national  comparisons  are  bedevilled  by  problems  of definition  and  compara-
bility which  are  particularly  important  when  even  mild  efforts  to dis-
aggregate  are  made.  Here,  for  the  most  part,  the periods selected for 
comparison  are  1960  to  1981  and  the two  sub-periods  1960-73  and  1973-81. 
The  approach  adopted  concentrates  in particular on  the 
observed  changes  in numbers  employed,  the  stock  of  fixed  assets  and  the 
flow  of  real  output  in  a  few  broadly defined groups  of  what  can  be  called 
the  industrial  production  sector.  Such  groupings  inevitably are 
somewhat  arbitrary,  but  the  intention  is to  construct  similar groupings 
across  countries  as  far  as  is possible.  The  basic 
(  1)  See  for  example  Baily  (1981,  1982),  Nordhaus  (1981),  and  Dennison 
(1983).  The  Nordhaus  paper  is based  upon  OECD  estimates  in  OECD 
(1980). -13-
statistical sources,  however,  are  based  on  the  individual  country  National 
Accounts.  Some  further  details  concerned  with  various  adjustments  which 
had  to  be  made  are  set  out  in  a  separate  Annex  on  Data  Sources  and  Methods. 
The  paper  is organised  in  the  following  way.  Section II discusses 
a  few  conceptual  points  and  offers some  justification for  the  aporoaches 
used.  It is fairly  short  given  the  already voluminous  literature and 
surveys on  the  subject.  The  data  used  is described  briefly  in  Section III. 
The  main  results  appear  in  Section  IV  where  both  aggregated  and  sectoral 
comparisons  are presented with  some  commentary.  Further  Sections deal 
with  various  adjustments,  some  of  which  lead  to  illustrative refinements 
of  the  figures  derived  in  Section III.  A final  part  is  concerned  with 
comments,  limitations and  conclusions.  More  detailed Tables  appear  in 
separate  Annexes. -14-
II.  The  Total  Factor  Productivity  Approach 
At  the  outset  one  must  start on  what  is an  apologetic  note. 
In  some  respects,  a  focus  of  interest on  the  behaviour  of  productivity 
is  a  strange  preoccupation  in economics.  By  productivity  changes,  in 
practice one  nearly  always  means  output divided  by  a  factor  input  or  a 
combination  of  factor  inputs.  That  is, changes  in  average  product. 
The  fundamental  nature  and  role of  marginal  products  need  not  be  stressed 
but  as  Stigler  has  so  aptly  remarked  "productivity measures  ••••• 
•••••  arose  in  the  face  of  a  theoretical  tradition which  denied  them  any 
relevance  to  economic  structure or  policy".  Again,"so  far  as  I  know,  not 
a  single theoretical  statement  of  any  importance  can  be  made  about  the 
average  products  of  factors"  (Stigler  1961). 
Yet,  as  is  abundantly  obvious,  the  overwhelming  bulk  of  comparisons 
are  based  on  average  product  measures.  Further,  these  have  now  become 
enshrined  in  the general  statistical apparatus  to  an  extent  such  that  it 
is difficult  not  to  go  along  with  the  general  trend. 
One  very  simple  and  well  used  approach  is  the growth  accounting 
methodology  which  is  that  followed  here.  This  rests  implicitly within  the 
standard neo-classical  formulation.  From  the  usual  Solow-type  production 
function  V = A (t)  F (L,  K)  which  is assumed  homogeneous  of  degree  one 
and  with  neutral  technical  progress  we  obtain the  following:-
Vg  =  TFig  +  TFPg  (1) 
TFig  =  sw  Lg  +  (1  - s  )  Kg  w 
hence  TFPg  =  Vg  - Kg  - s  (Lg  - Kg)  w 
(2) 
or  alternatively: 
TFPg  =  Vg  - Lg  - s  (Kg  - Lg) 
~ 
(3) - 15-
where  TFPg  =  growth  of  total  factor  productivity 
TFig  = 
II  II  II  input 
Vg  = 
II  output  volume 
Lg  = 
II  labour  input 
Kg  =  "  capital  input 
s  =  share  of  labour  income  w 
sn  =  "  profits 
Thus,  under  competitive  conditions  and  whilst  assuming  also 
that  labour  and  capital  are paid  the  value  of  their  respective marginal 
products,  total  factor  productivity growth  emerges  as  a  residual, after 
account  has  been  taken of  total  factor  input.  It corresponds  in 
principLe  to ·the  term  A (t)  in the basic  neo-classical  formulation. 
The  expression total  factor  productivity can  be  thought  of  a 
measure  of  total  productive efficiency.  We  can  see  this by  writing 
the  TFP  index  in static terms  as  : 
TFP  =  v  v 
--=-~ ---- F(L,K)  wL  + rK 
(4) 
where  w is  the  wage  rate  and  r  the  rental  on  capital  employed.  In  other 
words  (4)  is a  ratio of outputs  to  inputs  but  unlike  the engineering 
concept  it takes  account  of both  technical  and  economic  or price  components. 
The  residual  nature  of  the  total  factor productivity notion  as  formulated 
emerges  because  if the  idea  of efficiency  in  the  ratio given  by  (4)  is 
to  convey  any  real  meaning,  it is only  via  the fact  that output  V 
and  inputs  L and  K,  must  be  defined  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  not 
equal.  As  Boulding  commented,  "For  the  concept  to  be  useful, it is 
necessary  to differentiate between  significant  and  non-significant 
input  or output"  (Boulding  1961). -16-
In  such  a  scheme  it  is this feature  which  creates  risks  that 
empirical  estimates  of  total  factor productivity growth  will  pick  up  and 
include  not  only  the effects of  factor  inputs  other  than  labour  and 
capital  but  also  any  errors  in definition  and  measurement  of  the  included 
factors.  This  sort  of  entirely valid criticism  Leaves  several  choices 
open  to  the  practitioner. 
Using  labour  input  as  an  example,  one  could  adjust  the  labour 
variable for  educational  differences  and  •embody'  these  changes  in  the 
input  itself.  An  alternative would  be  to  specify  an  educational  input 
separately and  increase  the number  of  factors.  Or  one  could  regard 
improved  education necessarily as  part  of  disembodied  technical  progress 
and  treat  such  effects as total  factor  productivity  changes. 
The  standard growth  accounting  methodology,  at  least  as  followed 
by  its better  known  adherents,  lends  itself more  readily  to  the  last of 
these alternative interpretations. 
Returning  to equations  (3)  and  (4),  if all variables are 
defined  'correctly'  the  intention  is to  capture the separate effects 
of  shifts  in the  underlying  production,  which  one  may  wish 
to  identify as  a  form  of  technical  progress  and  at  the  same  time, 
movements  along  the  production  surface brought  about  through  factor 
substitution.  The  various  problems  noted,  however,  may  lead  to difficulties 
in  making  this distinction in  an  unambiguous  way  such  that  an  estimate 
of  TFPg  can  be  hard  to  isolate  from  the  factor  substitution expression 
s tr  (Kg  - Lg)  ( 2). 
It goes  almost  without  saying  that  many  practitioners  in this area 
of  interest  have  preferred to  work  with  an  explicit  production  function 
and  try to  identify shifts  in this over  time  given  various  assumptions 
about  the  character  of  technical  progress.  But,  whilst  the  problems  of 
specifying  factor  inputs  remains,  there is an  additional  important 
difficulty  in  being  able  to  approximate  the  appropriate  technology 
( 2  )  A good  critique is  Nelson  (1973) (3) 
-17-
accurately.enough  within .a  manageable  functional  form.  for  example, 
although  recent  developments  in duality theory  have  yielded  important 
unifying  links  between  production,  cost  and  profit  functions,  this throws 
the  burden  of  input  measurement  on  to  real  costs  and  unit  profits where 
on  the  face  of  it  there  seems  to  be  just as  many  obstacles. 
An  additional  issue  which  merits  some  mention  concerns  the  meaning 
and  nature of  such  work  at  highly aggregated  levels.  Quite  apart  fromfund-
amenta l disagreements about what capitaL or Labour inputs may or may not be, 
there  is  a  question to be  asked  about  what  a  technology  might  mean  for  say 
"manufacturing",  "consumption  goods"  or "energy goods"  production and 
so  on.  Thus,  whilst  one  may  wish  to  hold  Samuelson's  faith  and  pending 
a  repeal  of  the  laws  of  thermodynamics,  continue to  relate  inputs  to 
output,  one  is still faced  with  the  fact  that at  such  levels of  aggre-
gation,  the  engineering or  more  precise notions of  a  technology  in  which 
the  conventional  productton  function  is both  rooted  and  intended  to 
describe,  seem  at  times  to be  somewhat  remote.  In  other  words,  one  is 
entitled to ask,  what  does  an  algebraic formulation  set  in a  few 
arguments  and  which  purports  to  describe  an  aggregate  which  includes 
even  broadly defined  sectors  as disparate as  chemicals,  food,  processing, 
bricks,  pottery and  glass  and  so  on,  really mean?  Yet  at  the  same  time, 
if one  can  or  chooses  to disaggregate  down  to  manageable  levels within 
say  a  standard  national  accounting  framework,  can  one  hope  to  approximate 
differential  technologies  across  such  industries with  essentially simple 
functional  forms?  In addition,  the problem  remains  that all  too  fre-
quently one  can  be  faced  with  the practical  and  legitimate question -
how  does  country  A or  sector B compare  with  country  C or  sector  D? 
There  is  in  these  common  circumstances  an  inevitably delicate and  unsat-
isfactory trade-off  between  satisfying the  priors  imposed  by  rigorous 
demands  of  theory  on  the one  hand  and  the  need  to  recognise  that  aggre-
gated data  sets fall  some  way  short  of  such  demands  on  the other. 
Such  conumdrums  apply  to  both  the direct  production function  and 
growth  accounting  methodologies  with  equal  force  and  it is because of this 
that  the  latter, simpler  approach  is adopted  here  (3). 
(3)  The  author's  view  is  influenced  heavily  by  the  highly  perceptive 
remarks  in  Chapter  4  pages  118-128  of  Varian  (1978)  and  also  by  the 
~xtensive discussion  in  Chapter  7  of  Matthews  et  al  (1982). -18-
III.  Data  and  Definitions 
For  the most  part,  the observations  on  real 'OUtput, 
numbers  employed,  the  stock of  fixed  assets and  factor  income  shares 
are  those derived  from  national  accounting  estimates  tn  the  four 
countries.  There  are,  however,  some  exceptions  and  full  details of 
the  sources  used,  definitions of  the  sectors etc,  are  set  out  in  the 
Annex. 
The  sectoral  breakdown  used  is as  follows:-
Intermediate  Goods  Industries 
(of which>  Energy  Industries 
Equipment  Goods  Industries 
Consumption  Goods  Industries 
Manufacturing  Industries 
Total  Industry  including  Construction 
Output here is a vetue added conuept which does not include raw material 
inputs.  Although  this  is  conventional  practice,  it does  imply  that 
differences  in efficiency  in  the  use  of  raw  material  and  other  bought 
in  factor  inputs  between  countries  and  sectors will  be  reflected  in 
the  total  factor  productivity  residual. 
Of  the  three traditional or  classical  factors  of production, 
land  is omitted.  If  land  is  included  as  an  input,  a  major  and  probably 
insoluble  problem  arises  in  allocating  it across  sectors. 
The  Labour  input  is specified quite  simply  as  numbers  employed. 
It would  have  been  preferable  in principle  to  adopt  a  definition which 
is  closer  to  a  flow  concept.  Typically,  one  uses  total  hours  worked 
per  year,  standard  hours  worked  or  some  such  specification.  In 
addition,  one  can  argue  for  and  against making  adjustments  to  allow  for -19-
age,  educational  differences,  sex  ~omposition and  so  on.  Some  re-
searchers do  this whilst  others  do  not  and  the arguments  involved  are 
closely bound  up  with  the  comments  made  earlier in  Section II. 
Much  depends  on  how  one  chooses  to  interpret  the meaning  of  a  total 
factor  productivity  index.  In  fact,  it was  not  possible to obtain 
uniform  and  comprehensive  estimates of total  hours  worked  in  a  way 
which  matched  the  sectoral  breakdown  for all  countries over  the  sample 
periods  considered  here.  The  simpler,  although  less satisfactory 
definition,  being  numbers  employed  is therefore  used  throughout. 
The  measurement  of  capital  as  usual  is an  awkward  issue. 
The  definition used  here  is gross  fixed assets at  constant  replacement 
cost  prices.  First of all, there  is the question of  which  deftnition 
is  to  be  chosen,  gross  or  net.  Kennedy  and  Thirlwall  (1972)  for 
example,  favour  the gross definition  largely because  it helps  avoid 
having  to distinguish  between  economic  and  physical  depreciation. 
A unit  of  capital  may  be  physically  capable of  producing  a  flow  of 
output  but  be  obsolescent  in  terms  of  economic  criteria.  Because 
the  stock of  capital  is  really a  proxy  variable  for  the  flow  of 
capital  services,  a  depreciation  adjustment  which  is a  function  of 
the  age  of  capital  will  tend  to overstate  the decline  in this  flow. 
Net  measures  therefore  can  be  weak  in this  respect. 
This  does  not  close  the matter  however,  Smith  suggests  (1966) 
that  a  stock  definition is  jutified.  The  view  here  is that across  a 
typical  range  of  production technologies,  capital  stocks  must  be 
present  if the output  is to  be  produced  at all.  Utilisation of 
existing  capacity  can  only  be  varied by  means  of  adjustments  to  current 
inputs.  Smith  argues  that  it is, for  example,  difficult to -20-
conceive  of  any  meaning  which  might  be  attached  to something  like 
machine  hours  in  an  application to pipelines,  power  lines,  or 
highways.  The  stocks  themselves  must  be  present  ( 4  >. 
The  balance  of  argument  here  is difficult to.asses  and  in  view  of 
this, both  gross  and  net  measures  of  the  capital  stock  are on  occasion 
employed  in  the  estimates  of  productivity growth.  When  net  measures 
are  cited  however,  they  are  related to  net  value  added,  that is, 
gross  value  added,  less depreciation  and  the factor  share weight  is 
a  net  formulation  also. 
In  the  calculations,  no  adjustments  are  made  to allow  for 
utilisation of  capacity.  Over  the  two  decades  examined  here,  the 
pressure of  demand  has  varied a  good  deal.  One  common  practice is 
to  use  the  percentage of  unemployment,  or better, employment,  as 
a  means  of  adjusting  the  capital  stock.  Over  much  of  the  total 
period  however  it has  been  normal  to  regard  labour  as  a  quasi  fixed 
factor  and  hoard  it through  the  trough  of the  cycle.  To  the 
extent  that  this occurs,  any  adjustment  will  be  understated.  The 
question of  how  to make  any  such  adjustment,  some  trend  view, 
averaging  cyclical  peaks  and  so  on,  creates  a  separate  set of 
problems.  Here  it was  thought  better not  to  make  a  single statistical 
adjustment  which  would  have  a 'locking  in'  effect  in everything 
which  followed.  The  results are  presented  unadjusted  and  commentary 
is made  separating  where  appropriate. 
The  total  factor  productivity estimates  presented  in  the 
next  sections  and  as  indicated  in  equations  (2)  and  (3),  are all 
made  with  reference  to  a  specific  base  year.  Growth  rates  for 
the  most  part  are  calculated as  annual  averages  measured  from 
(  4)  The  argument  used  by  Smith  is set very  much  in engineering 
production  function  terms;  see  pp.  64-65. -21-
1960  or  1973.  Such  estimates depend  heavily on  the  factor  share 
weight  chosen.  The  most  obvious  and  consistent  approach  is to 
use  factor  shares  as  in  the  appropriate  base  year  of the particular 
sample  period.  This  implies  that the growth  of  both  total  factor 
productivity  (the  'residual')  and  total  factor  input  in  equation 
(1),  rests on  an  assumption  that  the  labour  and  capital  inputs 
are  paid  the  value  of  their marginal  product  in that  base  year. 
Alternatives  are possible  however.  One  may  prefer  for  example,  to 
analyse  the  whole  period 1960-81  together  with  the  sample  sub-
periods  1960-73  and  1973-81  using  a  single  constant  factor  share 
weight  throughout.  This  weight  could  be  1960.  Alternatively, 
it might  be  thought  more  reasonable  to  choose  a  cyclically "normal" 
year  as  the  appropriate  criterion.  Reference  to the  OECD  "Historical 
Statistics"  (1983)  does  not  provide  a  conclusive  result  on  this 
matter.  The  cycle of  industrial  production  and  GOP  was  roughly  on 
trend  in  France  and  the  UK  in 1970  which  happens  to  be  a  mid-year  of 
the  sample  period.  Germany  and  Italy were  a  little above.  In  1971 
the  situation was  reversed.  Factor  shares  moved  little between  the 
two  years,  so  it could  be  argued  that  1970  is not  a  bad  approxi-
mation  to a  normal  and  convenient  mid  year.  Clearly,  the  list 
of  possible variants  is virtually without  limit,  and  unfortunately 
the  final  results will  depend  in principle on  the  final  choice. 
Over  the  whole  period,  the  share  of profits  in  money  value 
added  has  not  remained  constant.  In  all  four  countries,  there  is 
a  strong  negative  trend over  most  of the period·as Table 4  below 
indicates.  A mid-year,  average  of  some  years,  'normal'  year,  or 
some  such  formulation  is  in one  sense  no  less  arbitrary than  a 
conventional  initial base  year  weighting  method.  However,  in -22-
Table  4 
Share  of  Gross  Profits  in  Gross  Value  Added  % 
Total  Industr~ 
1960  1970  1973  1981 
France  37.3  ~4.4  32.'5  25.6 
Germany  40.6  35.1  32.1  28.3 
Italy  45.5  36.6  34.3  36.5 
UK  31.3  28.6  32.3  35.7 
entirely presentational  terms,  to  see  how  factor  inputs  and  productivity 
evolves  if factors  are  assumed  to be  paid  in accordance  with  starting 
or  first  year  marginal  valuations  has  a  simple  intuitive appeal. 
Although  calculations  were  made  using  1960,  1970  and  1973  factor 
shares,  in  the  commentary  here,  the first  year  in each  of  the  two  sub 
periods,  namely  1960  and  1973  is  used  ( 5>. 
One  potentially troublesome  issue  in the  use  of  factor  income  shares 
can  arise because  of  self-employment  income.  In  the  case of  these 
activities, often it is  impossible  to  make  a  distinction between  genuine 
wage  and  profit elements.  One  does  not  know  how  to  impute  to  entre-
preneurs  a  true element  of  labour  income  for  example.  National  Accounts 
statisticians make  efforts to estimate these effects but  the problem 
(5)  The  other estimates are available from  the author on  request.  It  is 
worth  noting  that  Kendrick  (1981)  compares  1960-73  with  1973-79 
using  1973  factor  shares  as  weights  throughout.  The  year  1973  in fact 
is very  much  off-trend and  this qualifies  some  of  the  points  made 
above. -23-
remains.  How  important  this might  be  for  the exercise 
bere  depends  of  course  upon  the  importance  of  self-employment  in 
the  sectors  examined.  Most  self employment  income  is derived  in  the 
private  services  sector,  the distributive trades,  construction and 
agriculture.  The  industrial  and  manufacturing  sectors are  thought  less 
likely to  be  affected to  the  same  extent.  Whilst  this does  not  eliminate 
the  problem  it is believed that  its seriousness will  certainly be 
diminished. 
Finally with  four  Community  countries,  up  to  six  sectors,  net  and 
gross  capital  and  output  formulations,  different  bases  and  sample 
periods,  there  is  a  problem  of  what  and  what  not  to  present  for  discussion. 
Unless  stated otherwise,  the  rather arbitrary choice  made  here  is that 
emphasis  is placed  on  gross  output  and  capital  stock estimates.  In 
summary,  the  sample  periods  for  the  most  part  are  1960-73  and  197~-81 
the  bases  being  factor  shares  in  1960  and  1973.  Capital  and  output 
are  expressed  as  being  gross  of  depreciation. -M-
IV.  Empirical  Results 
(1)  Overview 
We  start  initially with  some  estimates of  total  factor 
productivity growth  (TFP)  over  the  whole  sample  period 1960-81  based 
on  equation  3  in  Section  II  and  using  the  1960  profit  share  for  S" 
Here,  both  gross  and  net  formulations  are  made  so  as  to provide  an 
early  comparison;  the  results  are  set  out  in  Table  5. 
In  most  cases  we  see  that  the net  of  depreciation estimates 
tend  to  be  rather  larger  than  the gross  figures.  This  is  what  one  would 
normally  expect  since  Sv  on  a  net  basis  usually  is a  good  deal  smaller 
than  Sw  gross. 
For  all sectors,  France  has  the  highest  rate of growth  of 
TFP,  Italy could  be  regarded  as  next  in  line with  the  UK,  despite  Energy 
Products,  being  the  least  successful  in this  respect.  The  ranking 
therefore  follows  exactly that  given  for  output-growth  per  head  in 
manufacturing  and  total  industry  in  Table 3, Section I. 
Concentrating  attention at  the  aggregate  level  on  the 
manufacturing  sector,  together  with  all  industry,  we  can  go 
behind  the  TFP  estimates  using  the basic  growth  accounting  formulations 
given  by  equations  (1)  and  (3).  These  enable one  to  make  a  distinction 
between  TFP  and  total  factor  input  (TF1)  in  the  contribution overall  to 
grQwth  of  real  output.  At  the  same  time,  within  the  neo-classical  model 
which  underlies this  scheme  of  thinking  we  can  break  the  growth  of 
output  per  head  into  its TFP  and  factor  substitution  components.  Thus, 
the  TFP  term  in  say  (3)  corresponds  to  movements  or  shifts  in  the  under-
lying  production function.  The  term  S~  (Kg- Lg)  indicates  movements 
along  this function,  or  the  amount  of  factor  substitution which  occurs. -25-
Table  5 
Total  Factor  Productivity Growth  1960-1981 
% 
France  Germany  Italy  UK 
Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net 
Intermediate  2.72  3.42  2.05  2.65  2.53  3.12  1.52  1.48 
Goods 
Energy  Products  4.26  6.66  1.50  2.24  0.11  -0.49  4.27  4.91 
Equipment  1.95  2.73  1.  70  1.82  1.50  1.59'  0.81  0.93 
Consumption  4.37  4.66  1.88  2.48  3.53  4.26  1.12  0.92 
Goods 
Manufacturing  3.48  3.75  2.43  3.01  3.06  3.68  0.91  0.84 
Total  Industry  2.96  3.29  1.97  2.49  2.13  2.57  1.27  1.19 
(4) -26-
Table  6 
Contribution bo  the  Growth  of,  Total  Factor  Productivity,  1960-81  ( 1) 
Manufacturing  Sector 
France  Germany  Italy  UK 
Vg  5.31  3.74  5.50  0.83 
TFPg  3.48  2.43  3.06  0.91 
TFig  1.83  1.31  2.44  - 0.08 
(t)  9  5.15  4.18  4.53  2.40 
sv  (~  g  1.67  1.  75  1.47  1.49 
Total  Industry 
France  Germany  Italy  UK 
Vg  4.90  3.35  4.63  1.20 
TFPg  2.96  1.97  2.13  1.27 
TFig  1.  94  1.38  2.50  - 0.07 
(t)g  4.64  3.82  3.98  2.80 
s7f  (~g  1.68  1.85  1.85  1.53 
Note 
(1)  1960  Factor  share  weights  using gross  output  and  capital  stock 
figures. 
% -27-
Table 6  sets out  estimates  of  the  components  of  the  two  identities 
given  by  equations  <1>  and  (3).  In all but  one  instance  one  finds  that 
the  growth  of  TFP  explains  a  greater part  of  real  output  growth  than 
does  the  growth  of  total  factor  inputs  (TFI).  Indeed,  in the  case  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  it appears  that  the  contribution of  TFig  over  the 
whole  period  was  marginally negative.  In  other  words,  the  growth  of  TFP 
is seen  to be  explaining or  accounting for all of  real  output  growth. 
The  other  identity which  accounts  for  the  growth  of  output  per  head 
suggests  here  that  for  three of  the  four  countries,  between  a  third and 
one  half of this  growth  is explained  by  movements  along  the  implied 
aggregate  production frontier;  namely,  the  process  of  tapital/labour 
substitution.  The  exception  is the  United  Kingdom,  where  the  proportion 
I 
is  rather greater and  closer to 60  per  cent. 
Moving  behind  these estimates,  Table 7  shows  how  both  employment  and 
the  stock of  fixed  assets  have  evolved  in the Manufacturing  and  Industrial 
Sectors. 
Table  7 
Growth  of  Employment  and  Real  Stock  of  Capital  1960-1981 
Lg 
Kg 
Lg 
Kg 
Manufacturing  Sector 
France  Germany 
0.16  - 0.44 
4.94  4.00 
Total  Industry 
France  Germany 
0.25  - 0.53 
4.65  4.06 
Italy 
0.97 
4.32 
Italy 
0.99 
4.62 
% 
UK 
- 1.57 
3.00 
UK 
- 1.59 
3.28 -28-
Over  the  two  decades,  employment  growth  on  average  was  static or 
negative. In  Italy only,  was  there  any  appreciable positive evolution of 
job  creation.  The  stock  of  fixed  assets,  however,  grew  at  an  annual 
average  rate of  between  3.0 and  5.0 per  cent.  Capital  per  employee, 
therefore,  rose  at  a  compound  rate of  between  3.5  and  4.9 per  cent  per 
annum.  The  general  impression  is one  where  Italy,  France  and  Germany 
appear  to  have  been  able  to transform  rather smaller  increases- in  capital 
per  employee  into substantially greater  increases  in output  per  head 
than  has  the  UK.  At  this  level  of  aggregation,  however,  what  emerges  as 
the  most  significant  feature  is the  apparent  inability of all four 
countries  to  transform a  varying  growth  of  both  capital  and  output  per 
head  into het  job  creation.  It  is this aspect  of  economic  performance 
in  the  industrial  sectors  of  the  countries  considered  which  is particu-
larly interesting and  disturbing. 
Growth  of  total factor  productivity over  the  twenty-one  years  was 
by  no  means  even.  The  general  pattern as  measured  from  the  base  year 
1960  is one  of  moderate  acceleration  up  to  the  late 1960's and  early 
1970's  followed  by  much  more  modest  progress  thereafter.  Table  8  illus-
trates this evolution  for  some  selected sub-periods  using  the  same 
definitions  as  in  Table 6. 
Table  8 
Total  Factor  Productivity Growth  in  the Industrial  Sector  % 
1960-65  1960-68  1960-73 
France  4.04  4.18  4.32 
Germany  2.50  2.36  2.52 
Italy  1.38  3.32  2.95 
UK  1.68  2.31  2.13 
Although  the  figures  are  not  shown  here,  the  growth  of  output  per  employee 
followed  the  same  pattern. -29-
(ii)  Pre  and  Post  1973  Experience 
Although  the  year  1973  is taken  here  to be  a  convenient  dividing  line 
in  the  sample  period,  the  development  of  economic  activity as  described  in 
Tables  1  and  8,  indicates  that  there  was  no  sudden  or  concentrated  break 
in  growth.  What  does  seem  to  have  happened  is that  growth  in  both  real 
output  and  real  output  per  employee  accelerated  up  to end  1968.  There 
was  a  slight  easing  up  to 1973- more  in  some  countries  than  in others -
but  after this date,  progress  certainly slowed  down.  The  break  point  used 
here,  therefore,  is  justified partly by  the statistical trend but  is  chosen 
also because  it happens  to be  the  year  of  the first oil  shock  and  has  been 
selected also  by  a  number  of other  investigators  in  the  field. 
Continuing  with  the  Industrial  Sector  in  aggregate,  Table 9  provides 
estimates over  the  two  sub-periods  1960-73  and  1973-80  for  the  main  vari-
ables  of  interest.  Differences  in  percentage  point  terms  are  given  in  the 
third part  of  the  Table. 
France,  which  experienced  the  most  buoyant  growth  of  both  output  and 
productivity up  to 1973,  suffered the biggest  decline,  followed  next  by 
Italy.  The  contribution of  total factor  input,  the  factor  share  weighted 
sum  of  labour  and  capital  was  most  important  in  Italy,  where  it accounted 
for  roughly one  half of  the  growth  in  real output.  In  France  and  Germany 
the  contribution of  TFig  was  rather  less  than this and  in  the  UK  it was 
less  than  one  quarter over  the  period  up  to 1973. 
In  the first  sub-period,  Table  9  shows  also that  factor  substitution, 
or movements  around  the  implied  aggregate  production  frontier,  accounted 
for one  third to one  half of  the  measured  growth  in output  per  head.  In 
the  second  sub-period,  the  contribution of  capital  deepening,  if anything, 
increased,  with  the  UK  providing an  extreme  case  where  capital/labour 
substitution accounted  for  virtually the  whole  of  the  increase  in output 
per employee. -30-
Table  9 
1960-73  and  1973-91  Compared!Industrial  Sector  % 
1960-73 
France  Germany  Italy  UK 
Vg  7.09  4.69  6.17  2.65 
TFPg·  4.32  2.52  2.95  2.02 
TFig  2.77  2.17  3.22  0.63 
([)g  5.85  4.56  5.08  3.43 
sv(f)9  1.53  2.04  2.13  1.41 
1973-81 
France  Germany  Italy  UK 
Vg  1.42  1.20  2.17  - 1.09 
TFPg  1.06  1.43  1.18  0.04 
TFig  0.36  - 0.23  0.99  - 1.13 
mg  2.74  2.65  2.22  1.80 
sli(Jg  1.68  1.22  1.04  1.76 
Difference  1973-81  minus  1960-73 
France  Germany  Italy  UK 
Vg  - 5.67  - 3.49  - 4.00  - 3.74 
TFPg  - 3.26  - 1.09  - 1.77  - 1.98 
TFig  - 2.41  - 2.40  - 2.23  - 1.76 
wg  - 3.11  - 1.91  - 2.86  - 1.63 
sn®g  +  0.15  - 0.82  - 1.09  +  0.35 -31-
The  net  result  is given  in the third part of  the Table,  where  it can 
be  seen  that  factor  substitution  in  both  France  and  the  UK  served,  to  some 
extent, to offset the  decline  in total factor  productivity.  In  other  words, 
the overall  view  is one  where  despite the  marked  decline  in  the  growth  of 
output,  output  per  head,  total factor  input  and  total factor productivity, 
there  remained  in the  four  countries  a  considerable  amount  of  capital 
deepening. 
In  fact,  during  the earlier sub-period,  the  capital/labour  ratio  in 
all  four  countries  grew  at  an  annual  average  rate of  between  4.0 and  5.0 
per  cent  (6).  During  the  second  sub-period,  however,  there  were  some 
noticeable differences.  In  both  Italy and  the  UK,  the  ~ate of  growth 
exceeded  5.0 per  annum,  whereas  in  Germany  and  Italy,  the figures  were 
3.8 and  2.8 per  cent  respectively.  Nevertheless,  in all four  countries, 
growth  of  the  capital  stock  exceeded  the  rate of  growth  of  real  output. 
Capital  productivity thus fell  and  this  helped  to pull  down  even  more 
the  growth  of total factor  productivity. 
Between  1973  and  1981,  the  growth  of  numbers  employed  in  the  indus-
trial sector of  the  four  largest  Community  countries  turned  sharply 
negative or,  as  in the  case of  Italy,  was  virtually zero.  The  biggest 
decline occurred  in the  UK,  where  the figure  was  2.9 per  cent.  The 
relatively poor  performance  measured  in  terms  of  net  new  job  creation 
during  the earlier sub-period,  therefore,  was  greatly accentuated. 
Continuing  accumulation  of  fixed  capital, although  assisting to maintain 
some  - albeit  much  weaker  - growth  in  real output  per  employee,  did not 
spill over  into additional  job  creation.  Looked  at  in  terms  of  the  cr~de 
growth  accounting  framework  used  here,  a  good  deal  of  the first period 
and  very much  of  the  second  was  characterised by  movements  along  the 
implied  production  frontier  in  a  capital  intensive direction. 
(6)  See  Annex  Tables  1 A to  D. -32-
This  process  is  illustrated in  Chart  1,  where  the  two  factor  inputs, 
labour  and  capital, each  normalised  per  unit  of  real output,  define  the 
axes.  Looked  at over  the  complete  twenty  year period,  what  we  observe  is 
a  mixture  of  movements  both  inwards  towards  the origin and  in a  south-
easterly or more  capital  intensive direction.  A shift  inwards  can  be 
interpreted unambiguously  as  a  gain  in total  factor  productivity or  tech-
ni~al progress.  Three  of  the  countries,  France,  Italy and  Germany,  show 
something  of  both  kinds  of  movement.  Nevertheless,  the  capital bias  is 
noticeable.  The  UK  remains  as  the  unusual  case  insofar as  there  is  little 
in  the  way  of  any  movement  other  than  in  a  capital  deepening  direction. 
At  this point,  it must  be  noted  that capital  deepening 
as  defined  here  does  not  imply  that  technical  advance  is absent. 
An  increase  in the capital labour ratio will almost certainly embody  improvements 
to  equipment  and  other  means  of production  and  may  also reflect the presence 
of  scale economies.  Neither  of these possibilities are  included,or 
"accounted for"  in the basic  formulation  as  set out  in  Section  II  where  the 
underlying  assumptions  are that  constant  returns prevail  and  that  technical 
advance  is  of  the disembodied  kind.  More  will  be  said about  these  issues 
in  subsequent  Sections of this paper. 
In passing one  might  note that  the estimates given  in Table  9  are  close 
to those derived by  other  researchers  in this general  area,  although  there 
are  some  differences  between  the  sample  periods  chosen,  countries  included 
and  so  on.  Table  10  provides a comparison  of  some  recent  studies  where  the 
figures  correspond  to  a  form  such  as  that  used  in equation  (3). C
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Table  10 
Alternative  Estimates  of  Growth  Differences  (1) 
Lindbeck  Kendrick  Aberg  Todd 
1973-78  1973-79  1973-80  1973-81 
1960-73  1960-73  1960-73  1960-73 
Output  per  Head  -2.3  -2.7  -2.4  -2.4 
Total  Factor  -2.2  -2.4  -1.2  -2.1  Productivity 
Capital /Labour  -0.1  -0.3  -1.2  -0.3  Substitution 
(1)  Components  of the  change  in growth  of output  per  head. 
Source  :  Economic  Journal,  March  1983  and  Table 8 
Notes  :  The  Lindbeck,  Kendrick,  Aberg  estimates  are an  average  for  Western 
Europe,  whereas  the figures  from  Todd  are  an  arithmetic  average 
of the four  largest  Community  countries given  in Table 9. 
(III)  Sectoral  Comparisons 
A sectoral  analysis of differences  in the  components  of growth  in 
output per  head  corresponding  to those  in the  lower  part  of  Table 9  are 
given  in Table  11  ( 7).  The  distribution of the deceleration  is 
brought  out  where  one  sees  the  retarding  influence of the energy  sector 
in  France,  Germany  and  particularly Italy.  Associated  with  this is the  sharp 
drop  in growth  of output  per  head  in the  intermediate goods  sector  where 
the energy  factor  is  an  important  input.  The  contrast  with  the  United 
Kingdom  which  benefited greatly from  North  Sea  oil supplies  is emphasised. 
(  7)  The  estimates  for  the two  sub-periods  1960-73  and  1973-81  on  which 
Table  10  is based  are given  in  Annex  Tables  1  A-D  and  2  A-D. -35-
Table  11 
1960-73  and  1973-81;  Sectoral  Comparison  (1) 
Difference  :  1960-73  minus  1973-81  (%) 
Intermediate  Energy  Equip-Consumption  Manufac- . Total 
Goods  Product  ment  Goods  turing  Industry 
FRANCE 
Vg  ·-6.48  -3.75  -6.04  ·-4 .11  -5.88  ·-5 .67 
TFPg  -4.38  -4.63  -2.78  -2.27  -3.48  -3.26 
TFig  -2.08  +0.88  -3.26  -1.84  -2.40  -2.41 
( ~)g  -4.31  -4.96  -2.54  -2.41  -3.41  -3.11 
s.  (~)  g  +0.08  -0.33  +0.24  -0.18  +0.06  +0.15 
GERMANY 
Vg  -3.80  -1.90  -·3.66  -2.57  -3.53  -3.49 
TFPg  -2.02  -3.13  -0.35  -0.39  -0.84  -1.09 
TFig  -1.78  +1.23  -3.32  -2.18  -2.69  -2.40 
(~)g  -2.97  -4.02  -1.15  -1.46  -1.91  -1.91 
s. (~  )g  +0.95  -0.89  -0.80  -1.07  -1.07  -0.82 
ITALY 
Vg  -5.48  -7.18  -3.29  -3.29  -4.46  -4.00 
TFPg  -2.91  -4.67  -1.32  -1.59  -2.04  -1.77 
TFig  -2.57  -2.51  -1.97  -1.70  -2.42  -2.23 
(~)g  -4.17  -7.35  -2.15  -2.29  -2.93  -2.86 
SK  f~)g  -1.26  -2.58  -0.83  -0.70  -0.89  -1.09 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Vg  -1.58  +5.02  -5.54  -4.94  -5.10  -3.74 
TFPg  -1.05  +2 .91  -3.58  -2.84  -2.67  -1.98 
TFig  -0.53  +2 .11  -1.96  -2.10  -2.43  -1.76 
~~)g  -0.06  +2 .13  -3.08  -2.48  -2.43  -1.63 
s.tng  +0.99  -0.78  +0.50  +0.24  +0.24  +0.35 
( 1 )  See  Annex  Tables  2 A-D. -36-
Within  the energy  products  sector,  total  factor  input  growth 
increased  between  the  two  sub-periods  in all  countries  except  France. 
In  Germany  and  Italy  however,  this  increase  was  not  of  a  scale sufficient 
enough  to offset  the  drop  in total  factor  productivity growth  with  the 
result  that  real  energy output  fell. 
France  and  Italy which  experienced the biggest  decline  in total 
industrial  output  between  the  two  periods,  fared  relatively badly  in all 
sectors.  In  all  four  countries,  the decline  in  manufacturing  provdes  an 
indicator  of the "de-industrialisation" trend,  with  the German  economy 
holding  up  best  in this particular  respect.  Indeed generalising this, the 
impression overall  is  that  the German  industrial  sector  absorbed  the 
effects  of the post-1973  world  recession rather  more  successfully than 
did  France  and  Italy which  experienced  rapid growth  during  the 1960's. 
The  complete  detailed estimates  covering  five  sectors of total 
industry for  the  two  decades  plus the  two  sub-periods  are given  in Annex 
Tables  1 A-D. 
Considering  the growth  of  real  output  first of all, we  notice that 
broadly  speaking,  around  one  third of this growth  is  accounted  for  over 
the  whole  twenty  year  period by  total  factor  input  growth.  This  approximate 
view  fits  closest  in  the  economies  of  France  and  Germany.  There  is  a 
fair  amount  of  variation however,  with  total  factor  input  growth  accounting 
for  sixty per  cent  of  real  output  growth  in  the  Equipment  Goods  sector 
but  around  twenty  per  cent  in  Energy  products. 
In  Italy,  the  Energy  sector  experienced  a  very  substantial growth 
of  total  factor  input  where  this  accounted  for  virtually the  whole  of  real 
output  growth.  The  major  influencing  factor  was  growth  in  the  capital 
stock  of over  six  per  cent  per  annum  over  the  whole  sample  period.  On 
average,  the growth  of the  labour  and  capital  unputs  accounts  for  a  greater 
proportion of  real  output  growth  in  Italy than  in  the other three  countries. 
The  United  Kingdom  is the  unusual  case  where  all but  one  sector, 
total  factor  input  growth  has  been  margi rally negative.  This  leaves  the 
growth  of  real  output  to  be  explained or 'accounted for'  in these  terms 
entirely by  the growth  of  total  factor  productivity. (6) 
-37-
Turning  to the  two  sample  sub-periods,  the  relationship between 
growth  of total factor  inputs  and  growth  of  real  output  is  summarised  in 
Chart  2.  Although  for  each  country,  five  sectors plus the total  for  all 
industry  are  available,  the pattern of observations between  the  two 
periods  is  revealing.  In  the earlier period 1960-73,  there  is  a  broadly 
positive  association  between  the  two  variables  as  one  would  normally 
expect.  This  association would  appear  to  be  broadly  comparable  in  the 
four  countries  except  that  for  France  and  Italy, the  levels  are  higher  as 
compared  with  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Indeed,  the generallyweaker 
post-war  performance  of  the United  Kingdom  is  again  highlighted  in this 
respect. 
From  1973  onwards,  the profiles  change,  in  some  cases  considerably. 
There  is  a  marked  drop  in the growth  of  both  total  factor  input  in all 
four  countries  and  a  corresponding  fall  in  real output  growth.  The 
limited  set  of observations  seems  to  indicate that  Italy, unlike the other 
three  countries  became  less efficient  in  transforming  inputs  into outputs; 
the  association  being  if  anything  negative.  During  this period,  employment 
in  Italian  industry fell  hardly  at all, and  the  capital  stock grew  at  about 
3.0 per  cent  per  annum.  In the  Italian Energy  Products  sector,  the growth 
of  factor  inputs  is particularly noticeable  with  employment  between  1973 
and  1981  increasing  at  an  annual  average  rate of  1.7 per  cent.  The  capital 
stock  rose  at  a  rate of  4.9 per  cent  over  this  same  period.  Energy  output 
however,  rose  at  less  than 0.5 per  cent  per  annum.  The  net  result  is  that 
total  factor  input  growth  in the  Energy  sector  was  much  faster  than the 
growth  of output  which  implies  a  rapid fall  in the "residual" total  factor 
productivity  component  of  real  output  growth. 
Chart  3  summarises  the  apparent  association  between  the growth  of 
real  output  per  head  and  growth  of  capital  per  head  and  is thus  a  graphic 
analogue  of equation  (3).  This  emphasises  clearly the extent  to  which  the 
increase  in capital  deepening  generated growth  in output  per  head  to 
varying  degrees.  In  France  and  the  United  Kingdom,  the general  impression 
across  the sectors  is  that  a  given growth  in capital  per  head  yielded 
much  less  in  terms  of  growth  in  real  output  per  head.  For  Italy and  Germany 
on  the other  hand,  a  summary  description is that  growth  in the capital/ 
labour  ratio fell  substantially and  also,  that  any  given  ratio resulted  in 
slower  growth  of  real  output  per  employee. C
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V.  Some  Extensions  to the  Analysis 
In this Section,  consideration is given  to  two  of the more  important 
restrictions on  which  calculations  resulting  from  an  application of 
equation  (3)  are  based.  Interest  cent res on the constant  returns  to scale 
assumption  in  the  light of  various  pieces of  empirical  evidence on  the 
subject  and  the  way  in  which  capital/labour  substitution is treated.  In 
addition,  some  comments  are  made  on  the  apparent  measured  decline  in  the 
average  productivity of capital.  At  various  stages  some  adjustments  to  the 
broad  estimates given  in  Table  9  are  suggested.  Although  these  have  what 
must  be  described as  an  illustrative role,  they  do  nevertheless  serve to  add 
a  note  of  caution when  it comes  to  interpreting the basic  results  in  terms 
of  economic  behaviour. 
(i)  Returns  to  Scale 
The  growth  accounting  method  used  as  a  basis  for  the  computations 
discussed  so  far  assumes  that  constant  returns  to  scale obtain  in all 
four  countries.  Whilst  this  is  a  convenient  assumption  for  many 
theoretical  and  computational  purposes,  one  must  recogni2e  that  at  several 
different  levels, there  is  a  range  of evidence which  would  support  the 
existence of  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  many  activities.  In 
particular,  such  evidence points  to  increasing  returns  in  the  manufacturing 
and  industrial sectors,  the  areas  of  interest  here. 
Empirical  work  at  the plant,  enterprise  and  industry  level,  for  the 
most  part,  indicates that  the  scope  for  potential  unit  cost  reductions  as 
capacity  increases,  can  be  substantial.  These  are  the  so-called static 
economies.  In  a  more  dynamic  growth  context,  the  existence of  "Verdoorn" 
and  "Kaldor"- type  effects  which  suggest  a  strong  and  positive  relationship 
between the growth  of output  per  head  and  output  growth  in  the  manufacturing 
sector would  appear  to  be  widespread. 
If  we  accept  this,  since  S  + S  > 1, one  cannot  use  sn  Cor  S  )  as 
1t  w  w 
a  weighting  factor  in the basic  formulations  used  here.  This  implies  that 
use  of  the  term  Sn  will  bias  the estimates of total  factor  productivity 
growth  and  of the factor  substitution term  also. 
• -41-
Within  the basic  formulation  a  crude  and  very  simple  method  of 
making  some  allowance  for  the possibility of  increasing  returns  is  to 
assume  that the  underlying  production  function  in  equation  (3)  is  Cobb-
Douglas.  When  making  comparisons  between  the  sample  periods as we  do  here, 
strictly speaking this is not  correct since we allow the factor  share  s 11  to 
change  according  to which  base  year  is  being  used.  This  violates the 
constant  factor  share  assumption. 
At  the  aggregate  industry  Level,  as  Table  4  shows,  between  1960 and 
1981  the share  of gross  profits  in gross  value  added  fell  steadily  in  France 
and  Germany,  rather  less  so  in  Italy and  rose  in the  United  Kingdom.  The 
adjustment  proposed  would  therefore  be  wholly  valid only  if a  1960  base  year 
factor  share  is  used  throughout.  What  follows  is  thus  an  approximation  on 
the  basis  of  an  - "as  if the various  economies  followed  a  Cobb-Douglas 
eve Luti on"  - variety  (  see  footnote  (  5)  on  page  23). 
Within  the basic  formulation  we  can  allow  for  the possibility of 
increasing  returns by  writing  S 11  + sw = R,  where  R is  a  scale factor  in  the 
assumed  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  ( 8).  Then  equation  (3)  becomes  : 
T FP  = V  - S K  - ( R - S  ) L  g  g  1[  g  J[  ·g 
(5) 
or  T  FPg  = V  - S  (K  - L )  - RL  g  1[  g  g  g  (6) 
Comparing  (6)  with  equation  (3)  we  have  a  difference between  the  two 
estimates  of total  factor productivity growth  equal  to  a  factor  Lg(R- 1).  In 
other  words,  the bias  from  assuming  constant  returns depends  on  the  scale 
parameter  R and  the  rate  of growth  of the  labour  input  Lg. 
The  next  question  concerns  the value or  values  which  might  be  attached 
to  the  scale parameter  R.  Here,  there  is potentially  an  enormous  range  of 
possibilities  arising  from  empirical  work  and  hence  a  high  degree  of uncer-
tainty.  Typically,  estimates  of  Verdoorn-type  equations,yield implied dynamic 
returns  to  scale of the  order  of  20-50 per  cent  and  greater,  which  is  substan-
tial  (  9).  At  the  same  level  of  aggregation,  direct production  function 
estimates  are  often difficult to  interpret.  Frequently  researchers  have  re-
sorted to  constraining  returns  to  scale to  be  constant  in order  to obtain 
useable estimates  of  say  the elasticity of substitution.  When  all parameters 
are  freely  estimated,  the  results  often produce  estimates  which  vary  over  a 
very  wide  range  also. 
( 8  )  Thus  we  have  V = [AL CJK 1-cs] R 
(9)  See  the  Symposium  on  Kaldor's  Growth  Laws,  Journal  of  Post-Keynesian 
Economics,  Vol.  V No.  3,  Spring  1983. -42-
Research  at the  micro  level tends  on  average  to  produce  estimates 
of potential  scale economies  which  are  more  modest,  although  many  such 
studies suggest that  within  the  manufacturing  and  industrial  sectors they 
are  widespread.  For  the  United  Kingdom,  Pratten  (1971)  for  example  argues 
convincingly that this  is the case.  Albach  (10)  for  the German  economy 
produces  rather  smaller  estimates, perhaps  below  10  per  cent.  A recent 
study  by  Owen  (1983),  although  confined  largely to  the  motor  vehicles 
and  "white  goods"  industries  in  the  four  largest  EEC  countries,  provides 
evidence of technical  scale economies  of  around  the 10  per  cent  mark. 
In  interpreting  the  various  estimates there  is the  important 
problem of distinguishing  between  genuine  technical  economies  of scale, 
technical progress,  learning  and  other effects.  The  more  dynamic  elements 
are  in principle included  in the  Verdoorn/Kaldor approach,  but  the 
conceptual  problem  remains  nevertheless.  Thus  the neo-classical  growth 
accounting  methodology  may  allow  for  some  longer  run  dynamic  scale effects 
included  already  in  the total  factor productivity term. 
Whilst  it  seems  somewhat  unrealistic  to  assume  the existence of 
generally available massive  scale economies,  it is likely that  there  will 
be  some  which  have  yet  to  be  realized.  In  some  sectors these  may  well  be 
of  importance.  It  is  likely also that  the  depressed  level  of activity 
since 1973  has  constrained  much  of  industry from  progressing  along  its 
expected  expansion path.  It  seems  sensible therefore to acknowledge  some 
adjustment  to  the estimates  in  Table  9  in order to  allow  for  the exist-
ence of economies  of  scale on  the one  hand,  and  the  loss of output 
arising  from  these not  being  realized to  a  certain extent  in the second 
period.  Since there is  insufficient reliable information for  one  to 
make  country  specific  adjustments,  a general  illustrative adjustment  is 
made  here;  this  is  more  in order to  see  how  sensitive the e.stimates  are 
to  a  scale  adjustment  than  to  imply  that  a  single value is relevant to 
actual  country  specific  experience. 
It  is  assumed  rather  arbitrarjly therefore,  that  the scale 
adjustment  takes  the form  :  RLg  = 0.20  Lg  1960-73 
RLg  = 0.10  Lg  1973-81 
where  the fall  of  10  per  cent  between  the  two  periods  is a  concession 
towards  a  weakening  in  scale potential.  The  underlying  and  probably 
(10)  See  Owen  (1983). -43-
unrealistic  assumption  therefore  is that  scale potential  in  industry 
is  much  the same  in the four  countries  considered. 
The  allowance  for  shortfall  of potential  scale economies  could  be 
interpreted also  as  a  capacity output effect.  From  1973  onwards  there  has 
been  an  increase in the  amount  of excess  capacity  in the European  and  wider 
OECD  economies.  ~eference to  OECD  published statistics certainly indicates 
that  the  amplitude of the  cycles  in  industrial  real  output  has  been  much 
greater  since  1973  and  the  recession phases  more  pronounced  (11).  As 
Lindbeck  (1983)  has  pointed out  however,  an  adjustment  for  capacity 
utilization based on  this  evidence  alone  might  be  misleading. 
The  longer  a  recession,  the  more  time  employers  have  in  which  to 
shat<e-eut  labour,  adjust. plant operations  and  so  on.  This  raises  all  of 
the various problems  related to  adjustment  of the  capital  stock  and  labour 
input  for  capacity effects.  No  direct prior  adjustments  have  been  made 
to  the series  as  used  here  which  is  a  limitation.  On  the other  hand, 
over  a period as  long  as  twenty  years  or  so, cyclical  factors  have  their 
importance  reduced  somewhat  so  that the estimates  for  the whole  sample 
period 1960-1981  might  be  less  affected.  The  comparisons  between  the  sub-
periods  however  are  a  different  matter  for  the  reasons stated earlier. 
The  organization  and  availability of the data  at  the sectoral 
level  examined  here  does  not  permit  readily a  capacity adjustment  to  the 
main  variables.  However,  one  could  think  of the scale effects  as  being  an 
adjustment  which  to  some  extent  incorporates  an  allowance  for  capacity 
shortfall.  This  shortfall  is  not  to  be  identified as  organizational  or 
X-inefficient effects;  rather it is  more  of  a  demand  constraining  effect 
which  prevents  realization of potential  unit  cost  reductions.  Again, 
the entirely illustrative nature of the  adjustment  must  be  stressed. 
(11)  See  OECD  "Historical  Statistics" 1983  op.  cit. -44-
(ii)  Factor  Substitution 
The  estimates of  capital  deeping  given  in Table 9,  as  we  have  seen, 
suggest that  approximately one  third of  the growth  in output  per  head  is 
accounted  for  by  increases  in real  capital  per  head  over  the period 1960-73. 
This  contribution  increased to  around  one  half during  1973-81  but  the 
contribution  to  the  slowdown  between  the two  periods  was  more  varied.  The 
main  feature  however,  is that  the  role played  by  increases  in capital per 
employee  in  accounting  for  the  reduction  in  the growth  of output  per 
employee  appears  to  be  relatively small  when  compared  wi·th  the  influence of 
total  factor  productivity. 
It  is of  course  very  easy to  criticize the basis of  such  estimates. 
The  most  obvious  and  central  weakness  rests on  the  implication that  capital 
deepening  does  not  generate technical  advance.  All  technical  progress  is 
assumed  to  be  entirely disembodied.  In  common-sense  terms  one  would  expect 
gross  investment  to  contribute to  improvements  in technical  production 
conditions;  the newer  vintages  of  capital  equipment  making  the  biggest 
marginal  contribution  and,  in effect, setting  the pace of technical advance. 
This  approach  includes  both net  investment  and  replacement  investment, 
where  the  latter is not  to  be  confused  with  pure  or  economic  depreciation. 
Simple  replacement  will  nearly  always  involve  some  improvements  to existing 
capacity and  thus  enhance  the growth  of potential  output  (12).  It is 
likely therefore,  that  use  of  a  fixed  base profits or  gross  wage  share to 
act  as  an  estimate of  the elasticity of output  per  head  with  respect  to 
factor  substitution will  understate the true effect. 
One  possible  way  of trying  to  make  some  allowance  for  embodiment 
effects  is  to  compute  a  relationship between  the growth  of output  per 
employee  and  the growth  of  capital  per  employee  directly from  cross-section 
information.  This permits  variability due  to different  countries  having 
different growth  rates  of  capital  per  head. 
Kendrick  (1981),  using  a  cross-section of  OECD  countries, obtains 
an estimated coefficient  (the elasticity) on  (~)9 
of 0.82  for  the period 
1960-73,  and  0.63 for  1973-79.  Lindbeck,  using  similar  cross-country data, 
(12)  Scott  <1976  and  1978)  develops  these  arguments  in  some  detail. -45-
finds  a  coefficient of  around  0.6.  At  the  industry  level  for  the German 
economy  over  the period 1970-81,  Todd  (1984)  finds  a  value of 0.81. 
Such  figures  are  about  double  those yielded  by  the factor  share estimates 
themselves  and  use  of the  higher  figure  will  increase the estimated 
effect of  factor  substitution  in favour  of  capital  and  correspondingly 
reduce  the total  factor  productivity estimates.  It is likely,  however, 
that  the estimated elasticity in crude  relationships  such  as  these will 
pick  up  the effects of  other factors  also,  including  such  effects  as 
changes  in quality of the  labour  force,  some  R and  D effects, organiza-
tional  improvements  in combining  labour  and  capital,  and  possibly  some 
scale effects  also. 
In order  to try and  take  some  account  of these  more  general  effects 
it is  assumed  that  the elasticity  Sn  is 0.7 for  1960-73  and  0.5  for 
1973-81.  The  first of  these on  average  is  roughly 80  per  cent  higher 
than  the actual profit share,  the  second  about  30  per  cent  larger. 
(iii)  Adjusted  Estimates 
Adjusting  the estimates  in.  Table  9  for  both  scale  and  capital 
deepening  effects  in  the manner  described produces  the figures  inTable 12. 
Table  12 
Adju~ted Differences 
France  Germany  Italy  United  Kingdom 
aJg 
- 3.11  - 1.91  - 2.86  - 1.63 
TFPg1  - 2.42  - 0.08  - 0.68  - 1.25 
S11 (f) 9 1 
- 0.69  - 1.83  - 2.18  - 0.38 
The  separate  adjustments  to the factor  substitution  (and  hence  to 
the total factor productivity terms)  are  given  be low  ( 13). 
(13)  Reference  here  is  made  to  the points  made  on  page  22.  If a  1960 
profit  share  weight  is  used  throughout,  all of· the estimates of  TFPg 
in Table  12  and  13  are  reduced  by  approximately  0.15  of  a  percentage 
point;  Sn~)g rises  by  the  same  amount. -46-
Table  13 
Adjustment  Factors  to  Capital/Labour Substitution Growth  and 
Growth  of  Total  Factor  Productivity 
196D-73 
France  Germany  Italy  United  Kingdom 
Scale  + 0.25  + 0.03  + 0.36  - 0.16 
Capital  Deepening  + 1.36  + 1.73  + 1.16  + 1.58 
Adjusted  s. (~L1  3.14  3.80  3.65  2.83 
Adjusted  TFPg1  2.71  0.76  1.43  0.60 
1973-81 
Scale  - 0.13  - 0.15  - 0.05  - 0.29 
Capital  Deepening  + 0.90  + 0.90  + 0.48  + 0.98 
Adjusted  s. (~) 91  2.45  1.97  1.47  2.45 
Adjusted  TFPg1  0.29  0.68  0.75  - 0.65 
The  negative  scale effects  for  the  United  Kingdom  in  the earlier 
period  and  for  all  four  countries  in  the  second  is a  reflection of the 
fact  that the growth  in numbers  employed  in  the  industrial  sector  was 
negative. 
We  see  in Table 13  that the role of  capital/labour  substitution  in 
accounting  for  the fall  in growth  of output  per  head  between  the two 
periods  is  increased  a good  deal.  In  corresponding  fashion  the  influence 
of total  factor productivity  is  reduced.  The  relative influence of these 
arbitrary adjustments,  however,  does  not  change  as  one  would  expect,  since 
the only factor  which  has  been  permitted to  vary  is growth  of  labour 
supply.  In  relative terms  this affects  the estimates  for  the  United 
Kingdom  and  German  economies  the  most  where  employment  declined signifi-
cantly, particularly in  the second  sample  period. 
The  average  capital/labour substitution effect on  the  adjusted 
basis  is  1.3 percentage points  which  is  about  one  half of the fall  in  real 
output  per  head  of  2.4 percentage points.  This  is  a  little above  the 
adjusted estimate  of  rather  more  than  one  third made  by  Lindbeck  for  an 
average of the  Western  European  countries  as  a  whole. -47-
VI.  The  Capital  Stock  and  Capital  Productivity 
The  numerical  estimates produced  here  rely  heavily on  official 
estimates of  the  stock  of  real  assets.  On  this basis,  what  we  observe is 
an  annual  average  increase  in  the capital  stock over  the twenty  year  period 
of  around  4.0 per  cent.  The  largest  increase  was  in  France  and  Italy,  with 
the  United  Kingdom  having  the  slowest evolution.  The  estimates  are  set  out 
in Table  14. 
Table  14 
Growth  of the  Capital/output  Ratio  - Industrial Sector  % 
Vg 
Kg 
(~1 
France 
7.10 
5.34 
-1.76 
1 .41 
3.83 
2.42 
4.89 
4.77 
-0.12 
Germany 
4.69 
5.16 
0.47 
1 .21 
2.36 
1 .15 
3.35 
4.08 
0.73 
Italy  United  Kingdom 
1960-73 
6.17 
5.78 
-0.39 
1973-81 
2.17 
2.98 
0.81 
1960-81 
4.63 
4.71 
0.08 
2.65 
3.74 
1 .09 
-1.10 
2.55 
3.65 
1 .21 
3.28 
2.07 
There  was  a noticeable deceleration  in  the growth  of the capital 
stock  between  the two  sample  periods  when  in  the  second  of these,  capital 
accumulation proceeded  at  roughly one  half  the rate of the earlier 
evolution.  Output  growth  however,  fell  even  more  with  the net  result 
that  the capital/output ratio  rose;  in  France  by  4.2 percentage points  and 
in  the  United  Kingdom  by  2.5  percentgae points.  Italy and  Germany 
experienced  more  modest  increases. -48-
It  is this  decline  in capital productivity which  assisted  in 
pulling  down  the growth  in total  factor productivity.  This  can  be  seen 
if  we  rearrange equation  (2)  to  write  : 
For  the  average of the  four  countries, the rise in the capital/labour 
ratio of  4.3 per  cent  per  annum  throughout  the  whole  period weighted  by 
an  average  wage  share of 0.63 gives a  value of  Sw~Ug = 2.7 per  cent. 
The  fall  in capital productivity of 0.7 per  cent  produces  the  average 
growth  of total factor productivity of  2.00 per  cent.  In  other  words,  the 
unweighted  average  decline  in  capital productivity accounted  for  one  third 
of  the  average decline  in total  factor  productivity growth. 
Between  the  four  countries  there was  a  lot of variability however. 
In  France,  capital productivity was  marginally positive and  thus  added  to 
the  growth  of total  factor productivity.  At  the other extreme,  the 
declining growth  of capital productivity of over  2.0  per  cent  in the 
United  Kingdom,  exceeded  the  rise  in total  factor productivity by  0.75  per 
cent.  In  both  Germany  and  Italy,  slightly declining productivity of  capital 
retarded the growth  of  TFP. 
The  use of stock  series for  the capital  input  acts  as  a  proxy  for 
the flow  of  capital  services  and  it  is this  aspect  which  raises  a  number 
of questions.  It  is  now  accepted  that  the sharp  rise in energy prices 
will  have  reduced  the present  value of that  part  of the capital  which  is 
energy-specific.  This  lowers  the productive worth  or efficiency of the 
available stock  and  thus  leads to  a  fall  in factor  productivity(14 ). It is 
doubtful,  indeed  highly unlikely, that  such  relative price-induced effects 
are  allowed  for  in  the official  estimates  as  used  here.  Presumably 
revisions  will  take place  in due  course. 
Having  said this, there  is  some  evidence  that asset  service 
life  assumptions  are  being  revised downwards  by  national  accounts 
statisticians (Paccoud  1983,  Blades  1983)  which  would  tend  to  reduce  the 
size of the stock  and  thus  reduce  the  measured  decline in capital pro-
ductivity. 
(14)  See  Baily  (1981). -49-
Table 15 
Ratio of  Net  to Gross  Capital  Stock  - Industrial  Sector 
France  Germany  Italy  United  Kingdom 
1960  0.568  0.610  0.595  0.598 
1965  0.589  0.581  0.599  0.633 
1968  0.593  0.563  0.578  0.633 
1970  0.596  0.561  0.573  0.631 
1973  0.597  0.561  0.570  0.618 
1975  0.591  0.545  0.568  0.615 
1978  0.578  0.524  0.541  0.602 
1980  0.572  0.517  0.531  0.590 
1981  0.572  0.514  0.532  0.583 
A second  set of  issues  is  concerned  with  the degree  to which  the 
quality of the  capital  stock  might  have  changed.  On  this there  is very 
little evidence.  A very  crude  indicator  is provided  by  changes  in the 
ratio of the  net  to gross  stock  of  capital.  Thus,  if one  assumes  that  net 
new  capital  embodies  the  more  up-to-date  technical  knowledge  and  thus· 
adopts  the  vintage embodiment  view  mentioned  earlier,  a  rise in this 
ratio would  indicate  an  improvement  in quality(1S).  An  increase  in the 
quality of the  stock  would  be  expected to  improve  the growth  of output 
per  head. 
If one  follows  a  different  line  and  argues  that  all  investment 
including physical  replacement  contributes  to  growth  in output  per  head, 
movements  in  the ratio of net to gross  capital  stock  would  be  less 
informative on  this  issue. 
Table  15  which  gives  the ratio of net to gross  capital  stock  for 
the industrial  sector provides  a  somewhat  ambiguous  view  of events.  In 
France,  the ratio  appears to  have  varied little over the two  decades,  yet 
C15>  In  DIW  (Berlin)  terminology this  is the  "Modernitatsgrad"  indicator; 
see  Kengel  et  al.  (1982). -50-
this  country  experienced  the  biggest  decline in the growth  of  both output 
per  man  and  total  factor  productivity.  In  Germany  and  Italy, the ratio 
of net  to gross  capital  stock declined fairly evenly over  the period  by 
around  eight  percentage points.  Italy experienced the  second  biggest 
slowdown  in  the growth  of output  per  head,  with  Germany  the  least  affected 
of the  four.  In  the  case of the  United  Kingdom,  the ratio  changes  Little 
but  with  reference to  France,  it experienced  a  moderate  slowdown  in produc-
tivity growth. 
Considering  capital productivity  in somewhat  more  detail, the 
official  estimates of the capital  stock,  as  we  have  seen,  leave  one  with  the 
strong  impression  that  over the whole  period,  capital productivity growth  has 
been  either  negative or  at  best,  irrproved  little.  Annex  Tables  1 A-D  show 
that  between  1960  and  1981,  in  France  only  could  it be  said that  growth  of 
capital productivity  rose on  a  fairly broad  basis.  Even  here  however,  the 
equipment  goods  sector shows  a  marked  decline of  2.0 per  cent  per  annum  over 
the period. 
Corrparing  the  two.  sub-periods  yields  mixed  results.  In  Germany, 
output  per  unit of  capital  declined  throughout  and  in  some  sectors  tended 
to  accelerate  in 1973-81.  France  experienced  a  pronounced  increase in capital 
productivity during  the first period 1960-73  of  almost  2.0 per  cent  per  annum. 
In the period 1973-81  there  was  a  sharp  decline which  yielded a  turnround 
between  the  two  sub-periods of over  4.0 percentgae points.  In  Italy, the 
experience is mixed  but  the general  picture  is one  of a  decline  in growth. 
The  United  Kingdom,  like Germany,  was  characterised by  falling  capital  produc-
tivity  in  all  sectors  which,  with  the exception of energy,  accelerated  in 
1973-81.  The  end  result produced  a  further  worsening  of  around  3.5  percentage 
points  between  the two  periods. 
Table  16  shows  differences  in  the  behaviour  of  labour  productivity, 
capital productivity  and  capital per  employee  between  1960-73  and  1973-81  for 
manufacturing  and  total  industry. 
Looked  at  in these terms  we  see  that  in  France  and  the  United  Kingdom, 
the fall  in capital productivity  made  a greater  contribution to  the decline 
in the  growth  of output  per  head  than did  changes  in  the evolution of  capital 
per  employee.  In  Italy, the  reverse is  mildly  the  case with  Germany  strongly 
so.  In  comparing  France  and  the  United  Kingdom,  what  is  interesting  to 
observe once  again  is  that  a  strong  tendency  towards  factor  substitution -51-
Table  16 
Labour  and  Capital  Productivity  and  Capital  per  Employee  Growth 
Differences  (1973-81  minus  1960-73) 
FRANCE  GERMANY  ITALY  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Manufact.  Total  Manu fact.  Total  Manu fact.  Total  Manufact.  Total 
(Og  -3.41  -3.11  -1.91  -1.90  -2.93  -2.86  -2.43  -1.63 
U)g  -4.13  -4.17  +0.07  -0.68  -1.55  -1.19  -3.97  -2.56 
(Dg  0.72  1.06  -1.98  -1.22  -1.40  -1.67  1.54  0.93 
generated quite  different  results  in  terms  of employment  growth.  On  the one 
hand,  there  is the  argument  that  in the  absence  of  capital  deeping  of this 
scale the fall  in output  per  head  would  have  been  worse.  On  the other  hand, 
the benefits  as  noted  have  not  appeared  in  the  form  of employment  growth, 
particularly so  in  1973-81.  For  Italy and  Germany,  capital  deepening  has  not 
been  so  pronounced  and  the decline  in this between  the two  periods  appears  to 
have  made  a  bigger  contribution to  the fall  in output  per  employee  than does 
the decline in  capital  productivity. 
Where  accumulation  is  concerned  therefore,  the  impression overall  is 
that  there  has  been  a  marked  decline  in  the  marginal  efficiency of  investment. 
Between  the  two  sample  periods,  this  suggests  that  the marginal  product  of 
capital  has  been  declining  relative to the  average product.  If  we  decompose 
the elasticity of gross  value  added  with  respect to the capital  stock  we  can 
see  that  this  is  likely to  have  been  the  case.  Thus  for  the  four  countries, 
Table  17  compares  differences  in  the  growth  of the  average  product of 
capital  with  differences  in the  return on  capital  where  the  latter is taken 
to  be  an  indicator of the  marginal  product. 
With  the  marginal  exception of  France,  it would  appear  that  there  has 
been  much  bigger  decline  in the rate of return  (marginal  product)  than in  the 
average  product. -52-
Table 17 
Capital  Productivity  and  the  Rate  of  Return 
Total  Industry 
Rate  of  Return  (16) 
1960-73 
1973-81 
Difference 
Aver age  Product 
Difference 
(see  Annex 
Tables  1 A-D) 
France 
13.2 
9.3 
3.9 
4.1 
Germany 
11.8 
9.8 
2.0 
0.7 
Italy 
8.8 
5.4 
3.4 
1.2 
(per  cent) 
U.K. 
9.2 
5.7 
3.5 
2.5 
Why  such  a decline  in  the  capacity of  capital  to  generate  more 
output,  employment  and  profits is  not  easy  to  say.  The  post-war 
reconstruction period provided  conditions  which  favoured  an  unusually  rapid 
accumulation  and  it is hardly  likely that this  could  be  sustained.  Returns 
at  the  margin  begin  to  fall  as  the  stock of  investment opportunities 
declines.  We  see  some  evidence of this  in  the  decline  in capital  accumulation 
in  the  second  sub-period. 
Another  strand  in this  argument  is that  suggested  by  Sargent  (1982). 
He  sees  the practice of  introducing generous  investment  incentives  in  most 
European  countries  as  a  means  of deriving  temporary  increases  in the growth 
of output per  head  by  accelerati~ the growth  of the  capital  stock.  Again, 
this  expansion  must  come  to  a  halt  which  creates  a  slowdown  in growth  as  the 
economy  adjusts to  a  more  normal  evolution of output  per  head  with  respect  to 
capital  per  errployee. 
Associated  with  the observed  rise in  both  the  capital  stock  and 
capital  per  errployee,  there  has,  as  noted  at  several  points  in  the  discussion, 
been  a  very  poor  evolution of employment.  This  suggests that the  investment 
which  has  occurred,  particularly in  the  second  sample  period  has  tended  to 
{16)  The  figures  here  are  from  Mortensen  (1984). -53-
be  of  a  more  Labour  saving  variety.  A simple  way  of drawing  attention to 
this possibility is that  provided  by  Chart  4.  Here,  for  each of the  six 
sectors  considered,  the growth  of the  capital/Labour  ratio  is plotted 
against the growth  of the  capital  stock.  If all  of the points  were  to 
rest on  the  45  degree  Line,  the growth  of employment  would  match  that  of 
the capital stock.  Points  to  the right of this  Line  would  denote  a greater 
emphasis  on  Labour  using  capital  investment. 
What  we  see,  is  that  in most  instances  there  is  a  movement  between 
the  two  periods towards  the  Left  of the  45  degree  Line.  In  other  words, 
one  inference which  could  be  drawn  in that  Labour  saving  investment  has 
become  more  predominant  through  the period  under  consideration.  This  is 
yet  another  way  of appreciating  the poor  employment  performance  of the  Euro-
pean  Community  <17>. 
As  to precisely why  this particular  factor  mix  has  occurred  is 
undoubtedly  a difficult  and  complicated  issue.  Recent  discussions  have 
included numerous  relevant  factors  and  the  various  arguments  are  not 
repeated  here.  Over  the  Longer  period however,  it is difficult to escape 
from  a  view  that  the  course of  capital  costs  relative to  Labour  costs  has 
had  some  part to play. 
Good  evidence  is not  easy to  assemble  as  a  consistent  basis  but  a 
variety of  what  might  be  termed  fragments  of  information do  move  in  a 
consistent direction.  Namely,  that  across  the  Community,  own  product  real 
employment  costs  have  tended to  rise relative  to  the  costs of providing 
capital  (18>.  There  are  two  aspects  of this  which  are  worth  emphasising. 
One  is the increase in the  willingness  and  ability of  Labour  to  bid  for  a 
Larger  share of  money  output.  The  other  is the  Long-run  tendency  for 
governments  to  increase non-wage  Labour  costs to the  employer  on  the one 
hand,  whilst  subsidising  capital  on  the other. 
The rise in non-wage costs has been associated in particular with the 
financing  of social  security benefits.  To  the employer  however,  they  are 
(17)  A recent  discussion of  Labour  using  and  Labour  saving  investment  is 
that  by  Scott  (1978). 
(18,)  Some  relevant pieces of empirical  work  relating  to  Europe  and  the 
United  States  are  summarised  in Todd  (1984). C
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a  cost  and  directly equivalent to  a  tax  on  Labour.  Across  Europe,  this tax 
equivalent  has  risen on  average  by  around  one  half of  a  percentage point 
per  year  over  the past  two  decades.  The  non-wage  element  now  represents 
something  of the order  of  20-25  per  cent  of total  employment  costs <19). 
On  the  capital  incentives side,  the  matter  is  a  good  deal  more 
complicated due  to  the fact  that  investment  subsidies exist  in  such  a 
complex  and  bewildering  array of  forms.  Nevertheless,  there  would  seem  to 
be  Little doubt  that  the effect of  Lowering  the  cost  of  capital  to  the 
entrepreneur  can  be  considerable depending  on  t~pe of  asset, type of incen-
tive, depreciation provisions,  inflation  and  so  on.  Kopits (1981) offers some 
calculations  which  suggest  that  the subsidy  arising  from  tax  incentives 
alone  can  be  as  high  as  16  per  cent  of the  asset  price.  For  equipment  and 
machinery,  the  average  subsidy  for  six  Community  countries  is  of the order 
of 6  per  cent,  ranging  from  zero  for  electrical machines  in Germany,  to 
13.0 per  cent  in the  United  Kingdom. 
There  are of  course very  good  reasons  why  one  would  wish  to subsi-
dise  certain kinds  of  new  investment  and  a  discussion of  these  issues  would 
demand  another  paper.  It is questionable nevertheless  whether  the pattern 
of  relative factor  rewards  which  we  have  observed  has  been  appropriate for 
the generation of  employment.  It  may  well  be  the  case  that  the  "deadweight 
Loss"  element  in capital projects  has  been greater  than  expected.  When 
coupled  with  a  running  down  in the growth  of  new  investment  opportunities, 
this  suggests  that  some  growing  part of  investment  has  taken place  in areas 
where  the  return otherwise  would  not  have  been  acceptable.  Those  benefits 
which  may  have  em~rged do  not  seem  to  have  been  translated  readily  into 
improved  returns on  capital, capital  productivity or  net  new  employment. 
(19)  See  Steinherr  (1983). -56-
VII.  Concluding  Comments 
The  analysis  and  discussion  here  has  concentrated on  certain 
particular  aspects  only of  factor  productivity growth  in  the  four  major  EEC 
countries.  Obviously important elements such as the role of government demand 
policies, changing  competitiveness,  changes  in  the  structure  and  quality 
of the  labour  fore~, capacityutilization,  the energy  factor  and  so  on  have 
not been considered.  The  intention is to try and see what some r-eadily avai table 
information on  output  and  factor  inputs  can  tell us  about  growth  and  pro-
ductivity performance.  The  results  are  summarised  below  in  Table  18. 
Table 18 
Growth  Averages  ~f 4  EEC  Countries  Total  Industry 
(Differences  :  1973-81  minus  1960-73) 
Vg  TFPg  TFig 
-4.2  -2.0  -2.2  -2.4  -0.4 
(per  cent) 
Kg  Lg 
-2.0  -1.9  -0.1 
Within  a  simple growth  accounting  framework,  the  analysis  suggests 
that  on  average,  about  one  half of the decline  in output  growth  between  the 
periods  1960-73  and  1973-81  has  been  due  to  a  fall  in  the growth  of total 
factor  inputs.  The  other  half is  accounted  for  by  a  decline  in total  factor 
productivity growth. 
Looking  at  the contribution to  the  fall  in growth  of output  per 
employee,  the  simple  arithmetic  averages  in  Table 18  suggest that the decline 
in growth  of  factor  substitution has  played  a  relatively minor  part.  Various 
admitedly  illustrative adjustments  however  serve  to  raise the significance 
of this  component  to  around  one  half of the difference.  Even  so,  between 
the  two  periods, the  growth  of the capital/labour  ratio  was  virtually 
unchanged.  Yet,  despite this more  or  less  continuous  capital  deepening  pro-
cess, the change  in employment  growth  has  been  strongly negative.  In  many 
respects, this  is  the  most  depressing  aspect  of growth  performance  over  the 
past twenty years  or  more.  Whilst  many  factors  bear  upon  this observation, 
it  seems  likely that  the  nature  of  capital  accumulation  has  had  some  effect. -57-
The  decline in capital productivity,  rise  in  capital  per  head  and  fall  in 
the  rate  of return all  suggest  that  the efficiency of  investment  has  for 
some  reason  been  declining.The  United  Kingdom  is the  most  extreme  example. 
This  may  be  due  to  a  combination  of  reduced  investment  opportunities  and 
an  unfavourable  factor price mix.  Certainly, the  latter  will  not  have 
helped  the employment  generating  process. 
One  can  argue  that  energy price  shocks  reduced  the  worth  of the 
existing  capital  stock  and  that  this  contributed to  the decline  in pro-
ductivity growth.  This  is  likely to  have  been  the  case  and  there  is now 
evidence  which  supports  this  view.  Yet,  in  some  countries, one  detects 
evidence of  a  weakening  long  before  1973.  In  France  and  Italy,  industrial 
employment  grew  at  an  annual  average  rate of  just over  1 per  cent  between 
1960  and  1973.  In  Germany  however,  such  growth  was  virtually zero  and  in 
the  United  Kingdon  it was  negative. 
The  general  impression  therefore  is that  investment  has  not 
generated the  benefits expected  and  that  some  investment  resources  must 
have  been  channelled  into  areas  where  the returns would  otherwise  have  been 
judged  inappropriate. -58- ANNEX 
NOTES  ON  DATA  AND  DEFINITIONS 
Classification 
The  basic  industrial grouping  followed  for  all  countries  and  which 
corresponds  to  the  ESA  convention  is as  follows 
Intermediate  Goods 
Energy  Products 
Equipment 
Consumption  Goods 
Mining  and  Quarrying 
Coal  and  Petroleum  Products 
Chemicals  and  Allied 
Industries 
Metal  Manufacturing 
Other  Metal  Goods 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass,  Cement 
Paper,  Printing  and  Publishing 
Other  Manufacturing 
Gas,  Electricity and  Water 
Coal  Mining 
Petroleum  and  Natural  Gas 
Other  Mining  etc. 
Coal  and  Petroleum  Products 
Gas,  Electricity and  Water 
Instrument  Engineering 
Mechanical  Engineering 
Electrical  Engineering 
Shipbuilding  and  Marine  Engineering 
Vehicles 
Construction 
Food,  Drink  and  Tobacco 
Textiles 
Leather  Goods  etc. 
Clothing  and  Footwear 
Timber,  Furniture etc. Manufacturing 
-59-
All  of the  above  with  the  exception of  coal 
and  Petroleum Products,  Coal  Mining,  Petroleum 
and  Natural  Gas,  Other  Mining,  Gas,  Electri-
city, Water. 
Thus,  Equipment  goods  include  Construction,  as  does  Total  Industry, 
that  is  Manufacturing,  all  Mining  and  Quarrying,  Construction,  Gas,  Electri-
city  and  Water. 
FRANCE 
All  data  is based on  1970  and  with  the  exception  of the capital 
stock  and  depreciation  are published  by  INSEE.  These  two  latter  variables 
come  from  unpublished  INSEE  sources. 
In  order  to obtain value  added  at  current  prices  an  estimate of 
stock  appreciation  was  obtained  by  multiplying  the opening  stock of  materials 
by  the  change  in the price  index  of  intermediate  consumption  of  branches; 
there  being  no  prices  at  the  sectoral  level.  The  opening  stock  of  finished 
goods  plus  work  in progress  was  multiplied  by  the  change  in the price  index 
of gross  output  at  the  branch  level.  Value  added  at  current  prices  was 
then obtained  by  substracting  the  two  estimates of  stock  appreciationa 
Constant  price value  added  is then  the  above  current priceestimate 
deflated  by  the price  index  of value  added  at  the  branch  level. 
GERMANY 
The  data  source  is official  National  Accounts  base  1976. 
There  is  a problem  in  computing  a  factor  cost  estimate of  value 
added  because  of  a  break  in the official series  in  1968.  Following  a 
suggestion  from  statistics officials at  RWI,  the  ration of value  added  at 
f  1968  <revised)  l"  d  h  l"  1960  67  ·  l  ·  actor  cost  1968  <old)  was  app  1e  to t  e  ear  1er  years  - 1nc  us1ve 
in order  to derive  a  complete  series. ITALY 
The  National  Accounts  base  1970  is the  major  source.  For  value 
added  at  factor  cost,  the series begins  at  1970.  However,  the  market  price 
series starts  in  both  current  and  constant  prices at  1960.  One  can  then  use 
the second  to obtain  an  estimate  of  the first for  the years  1960-1969. 
A problem  is  that  in  four  branches  :  Metals,  Industrial  Machinery,  Office 
Machinery  and  Electrical  Engineering,  there  is  no  constant price data  for 
1960-1969.  There  is  a  total  for  that  group  plus  a  current prices series 
for  the  four  branches.  To  fill  the gap,  the  same  price index  for  the group 
of  four  was  used  as  an  approximation. 
Value  added  at  factor  cost  was  obtained  by  working  back  from  1970 
using  the rate of  change  of  market  price value  added  in  volume  terms 
having  applied  the price  index. 
The  capital  stock  series  is  on  a  1975  base  which  meant  that  the 
value added  (factor  cost)  volume  series  had  to  be  converted  from  1970  to 
1975  in the  usual  manner. 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
All  of the data used  is that  in  the  National  Accounts  base  1975. 
For  further  details on  the profit share  and  other  calculations see  Reatti 
(1984)  (1). 
(1)  A.  Reatti  "Rate  of  Profit,  Business  Cycles  and  Capital  Accumulation 
in  UK  Industry 1959-81",  DG.II  Economic  Papers,  Brussels 
(forthcoming). -61-
KEY  TO  ANNEX  TABLES 
Vg  Rate  of  Growth  of  Real  Output 
Lg  Rate  of  Growth  of  Employment 
Kg  Rate  of  Growth  of  Real  Capital  Stock 
G)g  Rate  of  Growth  of Real  Output  per· Employee 
(~) g  Rate  of  Growth  of Real  Output  per  unit  of  real  stock of  capital 
(~)g  Rate  of  Growth  of  Capital/Employment  ratio 
TFig  Rate  of  Growth  of  Total  Factor  Input 
TFPg  Rate  of  Growth  of  Total  Factor  Productivity 
S1  Profit  Share 
Sx  (~}  9 
Rate  of  Growth  of  "Capital/Labour  Substitution" A
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